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“Our Martyrs of 1989 Did Not Die for This!”: 
Political Capitalism in Post-Communist Romania 
Cătălin Augustin Stoica  
Abstract: »“Dafür sind unsere Märtyrer von 1989 nicht gestorben!”: Politi-
scher Kapitalismus im postkommunistischen Rumänien«. As historical evi-
dence shows, there are multiple roads to such different forms of capitalism as 
“traditional commercial capitalism” and “political capitalism.” And, following 
Weber, not all of these forms can trigger the long term stable economic growth 
associated with Western rational capitalism. Although previous sociological 
analyses have improved our understanding of post-socialism, they have gener-
ated more controversy than theoretical convergence. This is because, I contend, 
many sociological studies have neglected the political and historical aspects 
involved in the construction of markets in the former communist bloc. In this 
paper I discuss the features of political capitalism in post-communist Romania, 
a case that has been infrequently addressed by mainstream analyses of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Specifically, I analyze the rise of political capitalism as an 
effect of Romania’s communist and post-communist political-institutional his-
tories. 
Keywords: post-communist transition, markets, politics, Romania. 
1. Introduction  
The phrase from the title belongs to a fifty year-old high-school teacher who, 
along with several hundreds of other people, took to the streets of Bucharest in 
mid-January 2012 to protest against the effects of the austerity measures 
adopted by the country’s center-right government and against a political class 
perceived as deeply corrupt. When I asked the protester mentioned previously 
what he meant by “our martyrs did not die for this,” he described to me the 
alleged sharp contrast between Romania’s current hardships and the ideals of 
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the Revolution from December 1989, in which he claimed he had participated 
and lost his best friend. He further discussed how the initial hopes for democra-
cy and economic prosperity of 1989 have been shattered to pieces by former 
apparatchiks, members of the (Ceauşescu’s former secret police) Securitate, 
and their offspring. Many other protesters I talked to held similar opinions, 
according to which Romania is a country marred by former communist politi-
cians’ survival. In this interpretation, the buoyancy of former communist elites 
has resulted in a “mock democracy,” which is controlled by a bureaucracy that 
is incompetent, highly politicized, and unaccountable to ordinary citizens, and 
in an economic system that rewards politically-connected individuals or firms 
and punishes honest, hard-working entrepreneurs. 
The protesters’ views were striking for at least two reasons: First, their lay 
discourses about Romania’s current ills contained many elements that could be 
also found in scholarly approaches to post-communist transition, which ana-
lyzed the rise of “political capitalism” in Central and East Europe. Inspired by 
Weber (1968), some students of market transition defined political capitalism 
as a system that is affected by the corrupt influences of politics on the econo-
my. Second, although even the more pessimistic scholars deemed “political 
capitalism” a temporary phase in some of the former communist countries (e.g., 
Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley 1998; Ganev 2007, 2009; Róna-Tas 1994), 
protesters’ opinions (as well as the opinion of the majority of Romanians) 
suggest that “political capitalism” still is alive and well.  
In this article, I outline some of the reasons why, as compared to other Cen-
tral and East European countries, Romania is closer to Weber’s ideal-type of 
“political capitalism” (i.e., an economic order which implies making significant 
profits under the protection of and/or through unusual deals with political au-
thorities). My argument runs as follows: markets do not arise naturally but they 
must be politically constructed through elaborated rules and practices (Polanyi 
1957). Consequently, the transition to a market economy depends on the suc-
cessful creation of new (market-supporting) political and cultural institutions, 
and the suppression of other (non-market) institutional arrangements. The 
creation of markets in post-socialist countries is likely to be influenced by two 
sets of factors: 1) the political institutional histories of the communist regimes; 
and 2) the completeness of the political break with the communist past (i.e., 
whether the former communists maintained their positions of power after the 
first free elections).  
This article is structured as follows: In the next section, I briefly review pre-
vious sociological studies of market transition and Weber’s concept of “politi-
cal capitalism” relying on his work and on Swedberg’s (1998) and Ganev’s 
(2007; 2009) contributions on this topic. In the third section, I discuss Romania 
communist political institutional history, outlining its possible effects on this 
country’s incomplete political break with the pre-1989 regime. In the fourth 
part, I address Romania’s convoluted political transition and its effects on the 
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economy and bureaucratic structure. In the final section, I present several tenta-
tive conclusions derived from the Romanian case of political capitalism, which 
has been infrequently addressed in mainstream analyses of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
2. Theoretical Background 
The transition to a market economy has received a great deal of scholarly atten-
tion. In mainstream American sociology, the outcomes of marketization have 
generated a lively debate triggered by Victor Nee’s 1989 influential article “A 
Theory of Market Transition.” Relying on survey data from the rural part of 
Fujian province in China, Nee’s (1989) analyses indicated that the introduction 
of market mechanisms eroded the advantages and power of local Communist 
Party officials (or “cadres”). According to Nee (1989), those who will benefit 
from marketization are the agriculturally self-employed and other small entre-
preneurs. Notably, Nee did not attempt to predict what individuals are likely to 
enter the small private sector. Instead, he focused on the consequences – in 
terms of income inequality – of entering the private sector for cadres, former 
cadres, and non-cadres (ordinary individuals).  
Nee’s (1989) study has been met with criticism by various scholars. Some 
students of China (e.g., Bian and Logan 1996; Lin 1995; Oberschall 1996; 
Walder 1992, 1996, 2000a, 2000b; Wank 1999a; 1999b) have claimed that 
instead of eroding the cadres’ power, the introduction of market mechanisms 
has increased it. Scholars working within Eastern Europe have also challenged 
Nee’s (1989; 1991) conclusions. Such scholars have provided empirical evi-
dence which indicated that in Hungary (Hankiss 1990; Róna-Tas 1994; Stark 
1990, 1992, 1996), Poland (Staniszkis 1991), and Russia (Hanley, Yershova, 
and Anderson 1996; Eyal et al. 1998), the former communist politicians are 
among the winners of transition. As mentioned previously, the controversy 
between the Nee and other scholars culminated in the so-called “market transi-
tion debate,” hosted by the American Journal of Sociology in 1996 (see Nee 
1996; Szelényi and Kostello 1996; Oberschall 1996; Walder 1996; Fligstein 
1996a; Stark 1996).1  
Some of the studies mentioned previously have several shortcomings. First, 
the market transition debate has lacked a unified theoretical framework to 
allow for meaningful comparisons between China – a nominally communist 
                                                             
1  A subsequent debate was hosted by the same American Journal of Sociology in 2001. 
Although Nee’s contributions were also acknowledged, this time around the debate was 
triggered by the publication of Eyal et al.’s (1998) book Making Capitalism without Capi-
talists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe; Michael 
Burawoy, Joszef Böröcz, David Stark, Laszlo Bruszt, Michael Kennedy, Gil Eyal, Ivan 
Szelényi, and Eleanor Townsley were among the contributors to the 2001 debate.  
 29
country – and Eastern Europe, where the Communist Parties lost their monop-
oly of power. Second, by relying exclusively on very broad concepts such as 
“plan” and “market,” some market transition scholars have ignored more spe-
cific institutional conditions of marketization and democratization (Walder 
2002a). Third and in connection to the previous point, with a few notable ex-
ceptions (Eyal et al. 1998; Walder 2003), studies conducted within the frame-
work of Nee’s “market transition theory” (1989) have little to say about the 
political and institutional conditions that might explain why former communist 
elites have had higher survival rates in some countries (i.e., Bulgaria or Roma-
nia) as compared to others (i.e., Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic). 
Fourth, when discussing post-communist trajectories such as merchant capital-
ism and political capitalism, some scholars have employed these types in a 
manner that is somewhat inconsistent with their classical formulation. As 
Ganev (2009) rightfully stresses, shifting back to the original meaning of “po-
litical capitalism” can shed further light on the intricacies of post-communism 
and enrich our understanding of a wide range of empirical evidence.  
Since “political capitalism” is at the core of my analysis, I begin by discuss-
ing its uses in studies of post-communism and Weber’s work. My discussion 
draws on Weber’s classical contribution as well as on Swedberg’s (1998) and 
Ganev’s (2009) excellent insights on these matters. As mentioned previously, 
some scholars have doubted that the downfall of state socialism would lead to a 
Western-style, rational capitalism. Staniszskis (1991) considered that the post-
communist transition would result in political capitalism: an economic and 
political order in which ex-communist officials would control and privatize 
public resources for their private benefits. For instance, in the late 1980s, 
members of the elite used their personal contacts and information acquired 
from jobs in the state bureaucracy for brokerage activities, especially in the 
export activities of state enterprises (Staniszkis 1991, 129). Along similar lines, 
Hankiss (1990) and Stark (1990) claimed that members of the administrative 
elite, foreseeing the collapse of state socialism, started converting their posi-
tional power into economic might. A widespread form of converting one’s 
positional power into economic advantages was subcontracting to small private 
firms in which managers of state enterprises had a personal interest (Verdery 
1996, 211; on this point, see also Stark’s [1996] “recombinant property” type 
and strategies). Once the privatization started, the magnitude of this capitaliza-
tion on positional resources only increased: “the privatization of state enterpris-
es created the opportunity for privileged elites with information and network 
advantages to convert limited de facto use and income rights into more de jure 
inalienable rights” (Feige 1997, 29). The character and outcome of these 
processes were suggestively labeled in Poland as “making owners of the no-
menklatura” (Staniszkis 1991, 129). Other terms employed in reference to the 
same phenomenon are “entrepratchiks” (from “entrepreneurs” and “apparat-
chiks”, Verdery 1996, 33), “kleptocracy” or “capitalism with a comrade’s face” 
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(Frydman, Murphy, and Rapaczynski 1998). The imagery used in the studies 
mentioned previously fits the category of “path dependency” approaches to the 
study of social change.  
Eyal et al. (1998) claim that, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, 
the principal agents of change and the possible winners of post-socialist transi-
tion are the “holders of cultural capital” (i.e., former anticommunist dissidents, 
humanistic intellectuals, and especially managers and technocrats) – a view 
summarized as the post-socialist managerialism thesis. Eyal et al (1998) admit 
that their thesis might not hold true in countries such as Romania, Bulgaria or 
Russia, which come closer to the type of “political capitalism.” Unlike “path 
dependency” theorists of post-communism (Hankiss 1990; Staniszkis 1991; 
Stark 1990; 1992; 1996), Eyal et al. (1998) draw explicitly on Weber’s classic-
al formulation of political capitalism. Specifically, Eyal et al (1998, 172) deem 
political capitalism an economic system which is oriented towards profits just 
like rational capitalism; the difference between the two systems is the interfe-
rence of state and politics in economies of political capitalism (on this point, 
see also Ganev 2009).  
Both path dependency and post-socialist managerialism theories share sev-
eral ideas. A first common element in both explanations is an individual’s 
“political capital,” which represents a particular form of social capital or net-
work resources institutionalized through the practices of the Communist Party 
(ibid., 22). In quantitative-oriented analyses of market transition, “political 
capital” is measured by variables such as “[Communist Party] cadre” and 
“former cadre.” Yet, empirical evidence shows that network ties among busi-
nesspersons, politicians, and state bureaucrats are also widespread in developed 
capitalist economies (see Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994; Granovetter 2002). In 
the Western world, such networks do not necessarily hinder economic activities 
and in some cases, ties between business firms and politics are responsible for 
high rates of economic growth and prosperity (Evans 1995).  
The state’s tutelage of and political interference in the economy is the 
second common element found in depictions of East European political capital-
ism. But state bureaucracies, political actors, and entrepreneurs interfere even 
in developed countries. State intervention is crucial to overcome economic 
backwardness (Gerschenkron 1962); states are indispensable to the functioning 
of modern capitalist economies by enforcing rules and regulation for economic 
interaction (Fligstein 1996b). Furthermore, state intervention in the economy is 
taken-for-granted in countries with polity forms that emphasize statism as 
source of sovereignty (Jepperson 2002). For instance, in France a strong central 
government was deemed essential for the nation’s integrity. As a result, the 
French industrial policy has been profoundly shaped by ideas of national inter-
est and expert state bureaucrats (on this point, see Dobbin’s analyses [1994; 
2001] on the development of the railway systems in France, England, and the 
United States in the nineteen century). More important, in some cases the 
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state’s tutelage of the economy is associated with high rates growth. This is 
especially the case of “developmental states,” which are characterized by an 
“embedded autonomy,” i.e., a combination of “Weberian bureaucratic insula-
tion with intense connection to the surrounding social structure” (Evans 1995, 
50). For Evans (1995), prototypes of “developmental states” are South Korea 
and Taiwan.  
Along with Swedberg (1998) and Ganev (2007; 2009), I contend that there 
is more to Weber’s notion of “political capitalism” than met the eyes of some 
scholars of post-communism. For Weber, rational capitalism and political 
capitalism are opposite types. In Weber’s view, the key features of rational 
capitalism are profit-making through fixed capital and free labor, trade and 
speculation in free markets, rational calculation, capitalist production and rein-
vestment strategies (Weber 1968, 164-6). In contrast, political capitalism 
represents an orientation to “opportunities for predatory profit from political 
organizations or persons connected with politics, including the financing of 
wars or revolutions and the financing of party leaders by loans and supplies” 
(ibid., 164). Political capitalism also involves profit-making “by virtue of do-
mination by force or of a position of power guaranteed by the political authori-
ty” – like in the case of colonial exploitation – and profit-making “in unusual 
transactions with political bodies” (ibid., 165).2  
As Swedberg (1998) stresses, these modes of economic organization should 
be discussed in relation to Weber’s types of domination. For instance, charis-
matic domination “is initially hostile to all forms of systematic economic activ-
ity (…)” but it subsequently introduces a “new kind of economic traditional-
ism, usually some form of patrimonialism and feudalism” (Swedberg 1998, 
65). Traditional domination is unlikely to nurture the development of rational 
capitalism “due to its arbitrary element (patrimonialism).” Instead, traditional 
domination and patrimonialism in particular are conducive to traditional com-
mercial activities and political capitalism (ibid., 69). Legal or bureaucratic 
domination is crucial to rational capitalism “through its predictability (rule of 
law), which is hostile to political capitalism” (ibid.).  
With a few notable exceptions (Ganev 2007; 2009; Verdery 1999; 2003), 
the link between a state’s bureaucratic structures and the mode of economic 
organization has been largely ignored by scholars who have addressed the rise 
of political capitalism in post-communist Eastern Europe. It is true that in 
countries like Romania or Bulgaria, political capitalism is related to the high 
survival rate of ex-communist elites. Furthermore, post-communist political 
capitalism does rely on old-boys’ networks or on individuals’ political capital. 
                                                             
2  In Swedberg’s interpretation of Weber, one could speak of three types of capitalism: ra-
tional capitalism, political capitalism, and traditional commercial capitalism, which existed 
far back in history in the form unsystematic commercial activities and money exchange 
(Swedberg 1998, 86) 
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Yet, the survival rates of former communist elites or the existence of such 
network ties alone could not have led to the emergence of political capitalism.  
A key element in this story of post-communist capitalism is represented by 
the features of state bureaucracies. For instance, Wank (1999b) suggests that 
what makes the difference between China and some East European countries is 
their bureaucratic integrity. The higher bureaucratic integrity of the Chinese 
state during market transition has left relatively intact the patron-client relation-
ships (ibid., 270). This fact has also implied that “popular norms and hierar-
chical authority were better able to operate as enforcement mechanisms be-
tween state agents and commercial operators” (ibid.). Against this backdrop, 
hierarchical structures of authority in the Chinese state, local governments, and 
party system are more effective in exerting control over “officials who trans-
gress the limits of community-based perceptions of legitimate amount of 
payoffs” (ibid., 271). Furthermore, to paraphrase Wank, Eastern European 
countries have been more successful in dismantling control rather than decen-
tralizing it, as in the Chinese case. 
While properly functioning control mechanisms are important, the crucial 
factor for Eastern European countries might be the existence (or lack thereof) 
of an independent, coherent, and rule-based bureaucracy, which, according to 
Weber (1968), is intimately associated with rational capitalism. As Ganev 
(2009) rightfully stresses via Weber, political capitalism emerges when various 
profit-seekers and politically connected entrepreneurs gain “unlimited and 
uncontrollable command over the state.” (Weber 1994, 104) Against this back-
drop, post-communist political capitalism is closely related to the “de-
bureaucratization of the state” (Ganev 2009, 657). This phenomenon can lead 
to the formation of a predatory state bureaucracy, which, according to Evans 
(1995) is characterized by a lack of control from the part of civil society. A 
predatory bureaucracy “embodies the neo-utilitarian nightmare of a state in 
which all incumbents are out for themselves,” and rent-seeking prevails (ibid., 
45-6).  
Clarifying the notion of “political capitalism” is but a first step in the at-
tempt to account for its rise in some ex-communist countries. To understand 
the emergence of post-communist political capitalism one needs to take into 
account larger institutional factors and mechanisms. In his 2003 article on elite 
opportunity in transitional economies, Walder formulated a unified theoretical 
framework that allows for meaningful comparisons among extremely different 
countries such as China, Vietnam, Hungary, Russia, the Czech Republic, and 
Kazakhstan. As mentioned previously, the 1996 “market transition debate” 
lacked such a larger theoretical framework and it ignored the political dimen-
sions of market construction. According to Walder (2003), the opportunities 
and constraints faced by elites in changing political and economic circum-
stances are influenced by two factors: 1) “the extensiveness of regime change,” 
which is defined as “the degree to which, prior to or simultaneous with the 
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market onset, Communist Party hierarchies lose their political monopoly and 
must compete with other organized entities for political power” (Walder 2003, 
901); 2) “barriers to appropriation of public assets for private benefits,” i.e., 
the extent to which policy and regulatory environment “allow incumbent elites 
[to keep] managerial control of public assets as they are privatized, or convert 
them into personal ownership” (ibid., 902).  
Walder’s (2003) theoretical framework allows us to classify various transi-
tional economies by taking into account both a country’s communist elite turn-
over (high or low) and the constraints (high or low) to stealing state assets. 
From this standpoint, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are countries 
with extensive regime change and high barriers to asset appropriation. In con-
trast, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are countries with a low degree of regime 
change and low constraints on the misuse of public property. Romania and 
Bulgaria are intermediate types in that they experienced a low to medium elite 
turnover but they also have few barriers to misappropriation of public assets.  
In the next sections, I take Walder’s (2003) argument a step further and seek 
to uncover the effects of communist and post-communist political histories on 
the extent of regime change and the rise of political capitalism in an infre-
quently discussed transitional economy (i.e., Romania). I contend that both 
elite turnover and the type of post-communist capitalism are influenced by two 
sets of factors: 1) the history of political and economic reforms during commu-
nism; and 2) the completeness of the break with the socialist past (i.e., whether 
the former communists stayed in power after the first free elections). Specifi-
cally, post-communist political capitalism is likely to emerge in countries that, 
prior to 1989, had no significant opposition, did not attempt to reform their 
communist regimes, and where former communists won the first free elections 
post-1989. 
3. Communist Political and Institutional Histories 
As I previously argued, pre-1989 institutional conditions and histories have 
influenced elite circulation patterns and transition’s economic outcomes (or 
regimes). Subsequently, I briefly discuss Romania’s communist political and 
economic history and I highlight its specific features.  
On August 23, 1944, near the end of the Second World War, Romania – un-
til then allied with Hitler – switched allegiance and a pro-Allied government 
took power. At that time, Romanian communists were a minuscule, negligible 
political force: 
there were only 80 [CP] members in Bucharest, and fewer than 1,000 
throughout the country, including those in prisons and concentration camps 
(…) Proportionally, the Romanian Communist Party was thus the smallest 
Communist Party in Eastern Europe. In absolute terms, it equaled the mem-
bership of the Albanian Communist Party. (Tismăneanu 2003, 279, note 37) 
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Yet, with Soviet pressure, Romanian communists were given a central role in 
the new government.  
With the further help of the Soviets, through intimidation, manipulation, and 
outright falsification, the communist alliance “won” the general elections from 
1946. Two years later, King Michael of Romania was forced to abdicate and 
went into exile. What followed afterwards is an example of mimetic (as well as 
coercive) institutional change. Like their comrades in the region, the Romanian 
communists adopted the institutional blueprints provided by Stalin’s Soviet 
Union. In the first period of mimetic institutional changes, the new regime 
targeted a rapid development via mobilization of all available resources (Jowitt 
1971; 1992), with a strong emphasis on industrialization.  
The early years of copycat Stalinism also implied the nationalization of the 
large financial and production sectors, followed by the nationalization of mid-
dle and small size enterprises, of housing stock, and the collectivization of 
agriculture. Along with nationalizing policies, the abolition of the multi-party 
system, the imprisonment of a large number of the pre-World War II intellec-
tual and political elites, and the beginning of a rapid industrialization, the his-
tory of Romania was also revised to show, for instance, the alleged positive 
role that Russia had always played in Romania’s past. This era of copycat 
Stalinism would partially come to an end with Stalin’s death. Fearful that he 
would be replaced with one of Khrushchev’s favorites, Gheorghiu-Dej refused 
to follow the de-Stalinization path preached by Moscow and started to mobilize 
various resources to impose an allegedly Romanian road to socialism (Ely and 
Stoica 2004). He began to show signs of dissidence from Moscow by cultivat-
ing relations with Western countries and with communist leaders deemed here-
tics by Moscow (see Tismăneanu 1992; 2003). Furthermore, Gheorghiu-Dej 
explicitly criticized and rejected the policies of the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (CMEA/COMECON), which called for economic specializa-
tion within the communist bloc. Internally, Dej sought to gain popular support 
to resist de-Stalinization and he did so by reviving Romanians’ anti-Russian 
sentiments.  
This national policy line was taken to new heights by Nicolae Ceauşescu – 
the person who succeeded Dej after his death in 1965. Ceauşescu moved away 
from the more purely coercive, “iron fist” of Stalinism, to a subtler mode of 
domination through the manipulation of national symbols (Ely and Stoica 
2004, 99). For instance, he continued Dej’s moves towards independence from 
Moscow and he started to decry publicly the annexation of Romanian territo-
ries by the Soviet Union in the 1940s. This independent stance culminated in 
the summer of 1968 with Ceauşescu’s refusal to join, and his criticism of, the 
Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia.  
The effects of Ceauşescu’s position should not be underestimated. On the 
one hand, it portrayed him as an independent leader in the eyes of the West. In 
some neighboring socialist countries, Ceauşescu became a hero and his 
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autonomous foreign policies made the Soviets extremely nervous. On the other 
hand, by playing on Romanians’ anti-Russian sentiments, Ceauşescu managed 
to gain an unprecedented support for his communist regime. This partly ex-
plains why Romania, in contrast to Poland and Hungary in the 1980s, had no 
significant oppositional movements. Beginning in August 1968, any criticism 
of Ceauşescu would be treated as a sign of support for the Soviet Union (Câm-
peanu in Linz and Stepan 1996, 348).  
Politically, during 1965-1971, the Party opened itself up and started to ac-
cept among its ranks even former political prisoners and individuals with a 
bourgeois background (Stoica 2005; 2006). Universalism or meritocracy was 
strongly emphasized in policies of recruitment into and promotion within the 
Communist Party. The regime also made unprecedented attempts to restore and 
abide by legal principles (the so-called “socialist legality”) – an important 
change as compared to the era of Stalinist justice and show-trials. These 
“Golden Years” also meant a lessening of the top-down control of cultural 
production. In the 1960s and 1970s a similar ideological relaxation led Poles 
and Hungarians to push for further reforms and challenge their communist 
leaders. This did not happen with Romanians because, as I said before, after the 
1968 events in the former Czechoslovakia, challenges to Ceauşescu’s rule were 
deemed unpatriotic and pro-Moscow.  
While at the end of World War II the private sector provided 90% of all ser-
vices (Brezinski and Petresen 1990, 73), nationalizing policies rendered this 
sector insignificant by 1960. Economic distortions, however, prompted the 
Romanian leadership to liberalize its policies towards the second economy. As 
a result, in the late 1960s, individuals were allowed to lease from the state such 
economic units as restaurants and small stores; “private craftsmen were al-
lowed to have apprentices again and small businesses were able to hire up to 3 
employees.” (ibid., 74)  
Unfortunately, the Golden Years came to an end in 1971 when, while visit-
ing China and North Korea, Ceauşescu became enamored with Mao’s and Kim 
Il Sung’s models of communism and their near-total control over society. Thus, 
by 1974, Ceauşescu gained full control over the party by outmaneuvering and 
defeating his predecessor’s barons who, ironically, promoted him as a leader 
back in 1964. International economic changes and turmoil were calling for a 
shift in economic policies from extensive to intensive industrialization. 
Ceauşescu, however, decided to continue with extensive industrialization. He 
not only froze the relative liberalization but also revived the Stalinist model, 
characterized by a hyper-centralization of the economy and hyper-politization 
of decision-making processes. The timid economic reforms from the late 1960s 
were reversed and activities in the small private sector (or the second economy) 
were nearly banned. 
Despite severe economic problems and declining industrial output, as a sign 
of his and Romania’s power, Ceauşescu decided to pay Romania’s foreign 
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debt. His unrealistic policies took a heavy toll on Romanians’ quality of life; 
shortages in basic products became so severe that Ceauşescu decided to ration 
many of them. Despite these rationing measures, most Romanians still strug-
gled to secure such items as bread, milk, meat, cooking oil, sugar, soap, toilet 
paper, and medicines. Like in other socialist economies, underground or black 
market activities became essential for the functioning and survival of Romania 
and its citizens.  
While most Romanians were barely able to survive, in the Party’s discourse 
Romania was experiencing one of the happiest periods in its entire history (Ely 
and Stoica 2004). Besides having near-total control over the economy, 
Ceauşescu also attempted to regulate almost every aspect of one’s private life: 
from establishing one’s residence, continuing with taking control over 
women’s bodies via pronatalist policies (Kligman 1998), and ending by “ex-
propriating Romanians of much of their control over time” – a practice that 
Katherine Verdery (1996, 40) suggestively calls “etatization of (personal) 
time.”  
In the late 1980s, when Polish and Hungarian communists were recognizing 
the legitimacy of the multi-party system, Ceauşescu’s grip of power looked 
firm. Surrounded by close family and sycophants, he was “behaving like an 
absolutist monarch, humiliating party bureaucrats (his vassals) and treating 
citizens like his property” (Tismăneanu in Linz and Stepan 1996, 351).3 The 
familism and personalism he promoted at the top of the hierarchy prompted 
some commentators to call his regime “socialism in one family” (Tismăneanu 
2003) or simply Ceauşescuism (Gilberg 1990). His more or less explicit at-
tempts to name his youngest son his successor were labeled “dynastic social-
ism” (Georgescu 1992; Tismăneanu 1992). Linz and Stepan aptly describe 
Ceauşescu’ rule in the 1980s as sultanism-cum-totalitarianism. Inspired by 
Weber’s ideal-type, sultanism in this context emphasizes  
the fusion between private and public, [a] strong tendency toward familial 
power and dynastic succession, (…) no distinction between a state career and 
personal service to the ruler, (…) lack of rule a rationalized impersonal ideol-
ogy, economic success depends on a personal relationship to the ruler, and, 
most of all, the ruler acts only according to his own discretion, with no larger, 
impersonal goals (Linz and Stepan 1996, 52).  
Furthermore, at a time when other East European countries were experimenting 
with economic reforms, Ceauşescu was adamantly rejecting them. Thus, in 
1989, Ceauşescu’s fief was a country with huge inefficient plants, megaloma-
niac projects, and a population literally struggling to survive. As compared to 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, Romania was severely 
                                                             
3  Tismăneanu is by far the most authoritative voice on Romanian communism. Readers 
interested in this topic should consult his superb study Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political 
History of Romanian Communism (2003). 
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handicapped on many economic dimensions. It had the lowest degree of ur-
banization, the lowest GNP per capita, and the highest values for repressed 
inflation and black market exchange rate. Most important, Romania had the 
least reformist economic history as captured by World Bank’s Index of Liber-
alization. In 1989, the Index of Liberalization was 0.34 in Hungary, 0.24 in 
Poland, 0.16 in the Czech Republic, 0.13 in Bulgaria, and 0 in Romania (de 
Melo et al 1996). Admittedly, Romania’s economy had some seeds for subse-
quent growth, as reflected in its low trade dependency on the former Soviet 
bloc and its moderate natural resources. Yet, as I discuss in what follows, these 
seeds did not get a chance to grow during Romania’s convoluted political tran-
sition. 
4. The Incomplete Rupture with the Communist Past 
What happened in December 1989 still is a controversial issue in Romania’s 
recent history.4 Some analysts call it a coup d’etat, while others see it as a 
revolution that was subsequently hijacked by second-tier communists. The 
regime became unhappy on December 15, when people in the Western town of 
Timişoara rallied around an outspoken Hungarian priest who was about to be 
exiled by the Securitate (i.e., the Romanian Secret Police). The Army was 
called in and forty people were killed in the following melee. Ceauşescu left on 
a pre-planned trip to Iran and upon his return on December 21 he organized a 
televised rally in Bucharest’s Palace Square to show the Romanian people that 
he’s still in control. Yet, people at the rally yelled “Timişoara! Timişoara!” and 
booed a Ceauşescu paralyzed by fear and confusion.  
In the night between December 21 and December 22, protesters occupied 
parts of downtown Bucharest and resisted the assault of the Securitate’s and the 
Army’s forces. On the morning of December 22, Ceauşescu and his wife fled 
Bucharest by helicopter. Protesters occupied the Communist Party’s headquar-
ters and the State Television. In these locations, several groups fought for pow-
er. One of these groups, which eventually became known as the National Sal-
vation Front (NSF), won the support of the revolutionaries who had taken over 
the television station. This group was led by Ion Iliescu – a former high-
ranking member of the Romanian Communist Party who, in the 1970s, had 
criticized Ceauşescu for his growing extremism. On December 22, the NSF 
began broadcasting that they had taken over as the new governing body, and 
                                                             
4  The 1989 events in Romania have been the topic of many scholarly and journalistic works. 
Readers interested in these events can consult Almond (1992), Gilberg (1990), Hall’s excel-
lent study (1999), Kligman and Verdery (1992). For an analysis of the Ceauşescus’ trial and 
its collective representation ten years later, see Ely and Stoica (2004). In these pages, the 
brief treatment of the December 1989 events draws on a previous co-authored work on this 
topic (Ely and Stoica 2004). 
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that citizens should to be aware of dangerous factions of Securitate – “fanatical 
terrorists” as they called them – who still supported Ceauşescu. Eventually, 
Ceauşescu and his wife were captured, summarily tried, and executed on De-
cember 25.  
The new government passed a series of much awaited laws guaranteeing the 
freedom of the press, and the freedom to associate and form political organiza-
tions. Other popular measures concerned the right to hold a passport and travel 
abroad, and the legalization of abortion. The NSF announced it would organize 
free elections but it would not transform itself into a political party and would 
not run in the upcoming elections. Yet, the NSF subsequently decided to run in 
the first free elections as a political party; its decision was widely challenged 
by newly established political parties and civic associations.  
Holding the majority in the Provisional Council for National Unity (CPUN 
in Romanian) and controlling the most important media in the country (i.e., the 
state television and radio), Iliescu won the presidential elections from May 
1990 by an overwhelming majority, i.e., 85% of the votes. His party, the NSF, 
won 66% of the seats in the new Parliament, which had the tasks of elaborating 
a new constitution and organizing general elections in 1992. As downtown 
Bucharest was still occupied by anti-NSF protesters, on June 13, Iliescu asked 
the coal miners from Jiu Valley to come to the capital city and defend Roma-
nia’s fragile democracy. Vigilante miners, joined by Bucharest workers, bru-
tally beat the students and other anti-NSF protesters, and destroyed the head-
quarters of main oppositional parties and civic associations.  
Only in Bulgaria and Romania did the second-tier communists win the first 
electoral competition. Yet, in Romania, this electoral outcome is intriguing if 
one takes into account the totalitarian nature and violent end of Ceauşescu’s 
regime. A possible explanation for this fact lies with Romania’s communist 
institutional history:  
[In the absence of any coherent, organized, and significant oppositional 
movements], it was exactly the sultanistic component of Nicolae Ceauşescu’s 
regime that enabled Iliescu to present Ceauşescu as the embodiment of the 
system and to imply that he, Iliescu, had changed the political and economic 
system by decapitating the hydra-headed monster. (Linz and Stepan 1996, 
368; emphasis mine)  
After the May 1990 elections, the new government attempted to implement 
further political and economic reforms. The private sector was given legal 
recognition and small businesses began to flourish. As a prelude to a subse-
quent land reform, peasants were given plots of land for private use, and the 
collective farms began to dismantle. Yet, in 1990, while talking to Romanian 
peasants about the demise of collective farms and the return to private farming, 
anthropologist David Kideckel found that some peasants were not enthusiastic 
about such prospects. They were also reluctant to join the newly established 
private agricultural businesses (i.e., voluntary partnerships). Instead, some 
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peasants were quite fond of the collective farms run by the state. Aside from 
their technological superiority, the state farms seemed attractive because, as 
one peasant put it to Kideckel, “It is better to be exploited by the state than by 
other persons.” (in Verdery 1996, 219; for analogous reactions among Bulga-
rian peasants, see Creed 1999).  
Similarly cautious attitudes towards privatization were widely shared by in-
dustrial workers. In 1991, after the introduction of a few radical economic 
measures, coal miners from Jiu Valley came again to Bucharest and overthrew 
the Prime Minister and the Government, with the tacit agreement of President 
Iliescu. He appointed a new Prime Minister and a government of technocrats; 
their main tasks were to govern and prepare the country for the upcoming elec-
tions in 1992. The new government also reversed the radical economic meas-
ures of its predecessor.  
In 1992, Iliescu was reelected President of Romania. While his Romanian 
Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) gained the largest number of seats in the 
Parliament, it did not have the required majority to form a new government. To 
achieve the majority and form the government, PDSR forged an alliance with 
two nationalist-extremist parties and governed Romania until 1996. During all 
this time, the second-tier communists’ approach to market reforms was hesitant 
at best, fitting the “partial reform” model.  
In 1996, Iliescu lost the Presidency and his political party was also defeated 
in the parliamentary elections. Emil Constantinescu, the former Rector of the 
University of Bucharest, was elected President and his political coalition (the 
Democratic Convention or CDR) won the majority of seats in the Parliament. 
Yet, due to fratricidal struggles, the CDR did not manage to implement much 
needed comprehensive reforms. The reformed communists used their political 
influence and economic power and – against the background of popular dissat-
isfaction with Constantinescu and the CDR – they came back to power after the 
2000 elections. Ion Iliescu became for the third time President of Romania.  
This time around, the former second-tier communists (under the umbrella of 
the Social Democratic Party or PSD) seemed more committed to market re-
forms and have made the integration of Romania into the European Union a 
priority on their agenda. However, as I will discuss in the next section, the 
reformed communists’ post-1990 long reign has nurtured the rise of political 
capitalism.5 
                                                             
5  For instance, in 1999 the GDP per capita (calculated on the basis of purchasing power 
parity) was US$ 11,501 in Hungary, US$ 8,991 in Poland, and US$ 5,441 in Romania 
(INSE 2004). Excluding the agriculturally self-employed, in 2000 the percentage of em-
ployers and self-employed individuals was around 14% in Hungary and Poland (own calcu-
lations using HCSO 2003, 91; CSO 2002, 136) and less than 12% in Romania (INS 2004, 
94, 100). In 2000, the private sector share of the GDP was around 80% in both Poland and 
Hungary, and only 60% in Romania (World Bank 2002). 
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5. Romania’s Post-Communist Political Capitalism 
Taking into account Romania’s trials and tribulations under Ceauşescu, the 
high survival rate of former communists in this country seems miraculous. Yet, 
as I argued previously, former communists’ “afterlife” is unsurprising given the 
weakness (or, rather, the absence) of the anti-communist opposition in this 
country as well as Ceauşescu’s sultanistic manner of rule. Readers might recall 
that, according to Linz and Stepan (1996), paradoxically, it was exactly this 
concentration of power in the hands of Ceauşescu and his wife that allowed 
lower level echelons of power to escape public rage and to flourish subse-
quently. Put another way, once Ceauşescu and his wife were executed, most 
Romanians thought their troubles were over and their Revolution successful. In 
this section, I discuss the effects of the incomplete rupture with the communist 
past on Romania’s transition. 
As I argued previously, the survival of former communist elites during tran-
sition has been influenced by a country’s recent history of opposition to com-
munism and by policy regulations that limited the ex-nomenklatura’s access to 
command positions after 1990. A case in point is represented by the Czech 
lustration law. This law was adopted in 1991 and it excluded former Party 
officials, officers and informers of the communist secret police from a variety 
of public offices (Eyal et al. 1998, 128-31). In Romania, the lustration law was 
adopted in February, 2012. The fact that it was passed more than twenty years 
after the collapse of communism seriously made many people seriously ques-
tion its applicability. Yet, at the end of March 2012, the lustration law was 
ruled unconstitutional by the Romanian Constitutional Court, because it re-
stricts some citizens’ access to public office.  
Turning to the circulation of former communist elites, Eyal et al. (1998) 
show that in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland only 39.3% of those 
who held elite positions in 1988 were still in elite positions in 1993. In contrast, 
in Romania, 74.2% of those who were in nomenklatura positions in 1989 were 
members of the first post-communist provisional government in Romania 
(Grosescu 2008, 328). The second post-communist government (1990-1991) 
included 57.1% former nomenklatura members, while the third and the fourth 
post-communist governments (1991-1996) had 47% and 44% of former no-
menklatura members among their ranks (ibid.). Former nomenklatura members 
radically diminished their presence in the governments led by anti-communist 
forces between 1996 and 2000. During that time, only 8.1% of former nomen-
klatura members were members of the 1996-2000 governments. When the 
Romanian former communists came back to power in 2000, the presence of 
former nomenklatura members in the government jumped to 18.5% (ibid.). Put 
another way, in 2004 – fourteen years after the collapse of communism – ap-
proximately one out of five government officials were former nomenklatura 
members. 
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A survey conducted on 177 (or 51%) members of the Romanian Parliament 
(MPs) in 2003 found that 86% of them had been members of the Romanian 
Communist Party (RCP) prior to 1989. One-fifth of the MPs previously affili-
ated with the RCP held leadership positions in its hierarchy (Ştefan 2004, 122) 
Yet, as the principal investigator in this study stresses, “this figure underesti-
mates the reality, as politicians are still reluctant to declare their active in-
volvement in communist politics” (ibid.).  
Employing nationwide samples of the adult Romanian population from 
2000, I have shown that, as compared to ordinary individuals, former “cadres” 
have higher chances of running businesses with at least 3 employees (Stoica 
2004). This finding seems to confirm Eyal et al.’s (1998) speculations accord-
ing to which the “political capitalism” thesis would cut more ice in Romania 
than in Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic.  
Speaking of the newly-rich, according to the Romanian business weekly 
“Capital,” in 2003, the late I.C Drăgan was the wealthiest Romanian, with 850 
million US dollars (Capital 2003, 34). Drăgan was an émigré living in Italy 
who allegedly conducted business with Ceauşescu and his regime. The fourth 
place on Capital’s list of the wealthiest Romanians was occupied by Sorin 
Ovidiu Vântu, with 460 million US dollars. Vântu is a businessman who made 
his fortune in the 1990s through elaborated financial scams that involved many 
government officials. His shady businesses nearly bankrupted the largest state-
owned savings bank, CEC. With 260 million US dollars, Dan Voiculescu was 
the eight wealthiest Romanian in 2003. Before 1990, Dan Voiculescu was the 
director of a foreign trade company allegedly run by Ceauşescu’s secret police 
(Gabanyi 2004). In November 2003, the average monthly salary in Romania 
was 150 US dollars (National Institute for Economic Statistics [INSE] 2004).  
In 2003, the list of the wealthiest 50 people in Central and Eastern Europe 
included five Romanians, thirty Russians, and six Ukrainians. In contrast, Po-
land had four multimillionaires on this list and the Czech Republic only one. 
Hungary’s richest person did not make it on the list because he was worth less 
than 300 million US dollars (Capital 2003, 215). Put another way, in 2003, 
some of the least reformed countries of the former communist bloc (i.e., Rus-
sia, Ukraine, and Romania) provided most of the region’s billionaires. 
According to Fish (1998) – from a list that includes numerous economic, po-
litical, social, and cultural variables – the best predictor of adopting economic 
reforms is the outcome of the first post-communist competitive elections. 
Countries where the former communists won the first free elections were less 
likely to adopt comprehensive economic reforms. Indeed, in Romania, the 
former communists – who won two consecutive elections post-1990 – were not 
too enthusiastic about destroying the old economic order. The second-tier 
communists’ approach to political and economic reform was hesitant, fitting 
the “partial reform” paradigm (Frye 2002; World Bank 2002). That is, the 
former communists favored a gradualist approach to reform. For instance, in 
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2001, when the private property was an unquestionable principle in other Cen-
tral and East European countries, Ion Iliescu – the ex-apparatchik who was the 
President of Romania for eleven years after Ceauşescu’s demise – said that 
“it’s just a fad, this business about the sacred private property as the basis of 
social life.” (Iliescu in Verdery 2003, 77; emphasis mine)  
More important, the ex-communists’ partial economic reforms were imple-
mented with little discipline (i.e., few if no hard budget constraints were put in 
place) and without public scrutiny (Dăianu 2004). Their preferred method of 
privatization was the so-called “managers and employees’ buy-outs” method 
(MEBO), which gave considerable advantages to regime’s insiders and manag-
ers. This has allowed the deposed regime’s insiders to gain the facto control 
over important economic resources (Gabanyi 2004); once in control, such 
insiders have blocked further reforms which would have deprived them of their 
advantages or rental havens.  
Here one should consider the effects of the regime-type on economy. For 
example, the World Bank’s Report (2002) distinguishes among (1) transitional 
“competitive democracies” (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, which are 
similar to Western democracies), (2) “noncompetitive regimes”(i.e., countries 
like Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, with significant barriers to political 
participation), and (3) “concentrated political regimes” like Romania, which, 
despite their multiparty system and free-elections, still are deficient in regard to 
civil and political rights, and participation.  
These regimes are associated with different levels of economic growth in the 
following way: Competitive democracies, such as Poland or Hungary, exhibit 
higher growth rates, despite variations in privatization strategies and the se-
quencing of their reforms. “Noncompetitive regimes,” on the other hand, “have 
made little progress in all areas of economic reform.”(World Bank 2002, 105) 
Romania, which throughout the 1990s was a concentrated political regime, had 
mixed results: “it has made some progress regarding liberalization and privati-
zation but it still lacks adequate institutional means to sustain growth.” (ibid., 
105) 
Equally important is the extent to which a regime-type provides opportuni-
ties for rent seeking and state capture. Competitive democracies limit to a sig-
nificant extent the frequency of rent seeking, whereas “noncompetitive regimes 
nurture arbitrage and rent seeking” (ibid., 109). Romania’s concentrated politi-
cal democracy presented regime insiders with numerous opportunities to si-
phon off state resources and use them in their private businesses. State capture 
(i.e., attempts by private enterprises to influence legislation and law enforce-
ment through political protection or payments made to public officials) is less 
of a problem in competitive transitional regimes such as Hungary and Poland. 
By the end of the 1990s, state capture in concentrated regimes (i.e., Romania) 
was, on average, twice as higher as in competitive regimes (ibid., 106). 
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Thus, the first fourteen years after the collapse of Ceauşescu’s regime paved 
the way for the emergence of political capitalism. These years can be labeled as 
a period of power seeking wealth, when ex-communist political elites at-
tempted (and many of them succeeded) to convert their former positions of 
power into economic might. The key resource for this conversion was an indi-
vidual’s “(communist) political capital,” institutionalized through social net-
works formed under the auspices of the Communist Party. For instance, in a 
comparative study of informal networks in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bul-
garia, and Romania, Grødeland (2007, 230) found that, in post-communist 
Romania, political contacts were most common and necessary in business. 
Furthermore, only in post-1990 Romania, communist-era social ties were cru-
cial for both business and politics (ibid., 249). Relying on such network ties, 
politically-connected individuals or the so-called “smart guys” (“băieţii de-
ştepţi” in Romanian) were able to gain access to financial resources (i.e., loans 
from banks) and/or to privileged information about impending privatizations.6 
These social networks also helped some former communist officials to obtain 
licenses to operate in profitable sectors, which were usually controlled by the 
state. 
Valuable political connections and an environment with no policy restric-
tions allowed former Romanian communist elites and newly elected officials to 
engineer and implement ingenious strategies to privatize unofficially state 
resources. As mentioned earlier, an example of unofficial privatization was 
subcontracting to small private firms in which managers of state enterprises 
had a personal interest (Verdery 1996). This strategy was somewhat similar to 
the reorganization of property rights through networks of firms in post-socialist 
Hungary (Stark 1996). This reorganization implied a network that had at its 
core a state-owned firm and several private firms as its satellites; these satellite 
firms were controlled or owned (directly or indirectly) by managers of the 
state-owned firm. This type of “recombinant property” (Stark 1996) also relied 
on specific accounting procedures: profits went to satellite firms while all li-
abilities where transferred to the state-owned firm.7 In Romania, such private 
satellite firms are known as “tick firms” (“firme căpuşă” in Romanian); in this 
analogy, just like ticks, private satellite firms drain (or “suck”) the resources 
(“blood”) of state-owned entities.  
Such practices are closely related to the processes of siphoning off of public 
resources. Some of those who engage in siphoning off state resources belong to 
                                                             
6  On this point, see the case of “Bancorex,” a Romanian state-owned bank, famous for giving 
loans on grounds of political clientelistic ties; the bank went bankrupt as a result of its loan-
granting policy. 
7  The Hungarian government’s decision to privatize the largest state firms with the help of 
foreign investors eventually limited the phenomenon of “recombinant property (see Hanley, 
King, and Tóth 2002). 
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the the so-called type of part-time entrepreneurs. This type includes individuals 
who, besides their main job, (legally) run private businesses. In Romania, part-
time entrepreneurs are also found among holders of public offices, who use 
their positions of power as a platform for increasing (illegally) their personal 
wealth (Stoica 2004, 251-52).  
Yet, as I stressed previously, these corrupt practices have at their back-
ground and heavily depend on the de-bureaucratization of the post-communist 
state (Ganev 2009). The de-bureaucratization of the state implies that public 
institutions are “transgressed by social predators … [and that] the civil service 
behaves as an uncoordinated multitude of self-interested agents pursuing im-
mediate financial gratification” (ibid., 656). This de-bureaucratization process 
has been suggestively labeled “preying on the state” by Ganev (2007) in his 
excellent analysis of post-communist Bulgaria. In a similar vein, documenting 
Romania’s convoluted transition in the early 1990s, Verdery (1996) spoke of 
the “privatization of [state] power.” As Chelcea, Lăţea, and Mateescu (2004, 
29) note, the privatization of power “does not refer to a complete overtake of 
state power by private actors but to the appropriation of discrete offices or 
organizations that apply different rules to different people.”  
In a study on post-socialist entrepreneurship I personally conducted in Ro-
mania in the early 2000s, I also encountered numerous stories that fit the types 
of “de-bureaucratization of the state” (Ganev 2009) and “privatization of 
power” (Verdery 1996). Although rooted in personal interactions with Roma-
nian bureaucrats, my respondents’ accounts of bureaucratic incompetence and 
corruption were confirmed by other sources. Let me illustrate this point by 
relying on Meyer, Drori, and Jang’s concept of “national administrative cul-
ture.” Their concept relies on a synthetic measure that reflects the degree of 
rationalization of the culture of administration in a particular country (Meyer et 
al. 2000, 8).8 For Romania, the factor score of administrative rationality in 1995 
was -.02 (minus .02, that is) indicating: a high risk of expropriation, a great 
likelihood of repudiation of contracts, low bureaucratic quality (i.e., weak and 
non-expert bureaucracy), high corruption, and low level of a well-established 
law and order tradition. In contrast, the administrative rationality factor score in 
1995 was .78 in Hungary, 1.11 in Poland, and .95 in the Czech Republic – 
which indicate a higher degree of administrative rationality.9 I also note that the 
Corruption Perception Index for the year 2000, which varies from 10 (highly 
clean) to 0 (highly corrupt), had a value of 2.9 in Romania, 5.2 in Hungary, and 
4.1 in Poland (Transparency International 2000). More importantly, as 
Mateescu notes (2001, 390), until 1999 Romania did not have a law dealing 
                                                             
8  I thank John W. Meyer, Gili S. Drori, and Yong Suk Jang for allowing me to employ their 
panel data and measures on administrative rationality. 
9  For sake of comparisons, the administrative rationality factor score varies from -2.78 (in 
Liberia) to +1.54 (in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Netherlands). 
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explicitly with corruption. The Penal Code contained provisions regarding only 
bribery and influence peddling, with no explicit mention of corruption.  
Observing the mixture between local politics and business interests in Ro-
mania, Verdery (1996) suggested that this country might be transitioning not to 
capitalism but to a neo-feudal order. This neo-feudal order had at its center the 
so-called “local barons” – public (local) officials who have become incredibly 
rich by siphoning off state resources. Against this backdrop, political parties in 
Romania could be aptly described as a “formally institutionalized network of 
friends, relatives, and other associates who engage corporately in the electoral 
and legislative process.” (Verdery 1996, 193)  
One would have hoped that free elections would result in a higher account-
ability of public officials. But despite some positive formal changes, the struc-
tures of post-socialist Romanian bureaucracy have also become, for want of 
another term, extremely “volatile.” This volatility is rooted in the practices of 
altering the composition of local governing bodies and other state agencies 
after every local and central election. There is a widespread perception that 
every newly elected public official brings to office not only photos of his fam-
ily and friends but also the people themselves. Seemingly, every election is 
followed by top-down radical changes in the composition of local and/or cen-
tral bureaucracies. This is partly so because, until 1999, Romania did not have 
a Civil Service Law stating clearly the obligations and rights of civil servants; 
such a law might have protected state bureaucrats from political pressures and 
fads (Mateescu 2001, 390). 
Overall, between 2000 and 2004 corruption and predatory behaviors of pub-
lic officials became rampant and Romania’s political regime exposed semi-
authoritarian tendencies (Gross and Tismăneanu 2005) and neo-patrimonialist 
features (Sellin 2004).  
In 2004, oppositional forces managed to mobilize their supporters and 
Adrian Năstase – the former Social Democrat Prime-Minister – was defeated in 
his bid for the Presidency by the Bucharest Mayor Traian Băsescu of the oppo-
sition “Justice and Truth Alliance” (“Alianţa D.A.,” in Romanian). Subse-
quently, DA forged an alliance with two other parliamentary parties and 
formed the government. The newly elected government, which consists of a 
coalition of center-right political parties, seems to be extremely committed to 
implement radical legal and economic reforms, eradicate corruption, and make 
sure that Romania would join the European Union in January, 2007. 
Romania did join the EU in 2007 but, due to several conflicts, President 
Băsescu’ s Democratic Party (PD) was forced out of the government. Between 
2007 and 2008, the government consisted mainly of members of the National 
Liberal Party (PNL), headed by the Prime-Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu. 
Overall, the period from 2004 to 2008 was one of relative prosperity and eco-
nomic growth. The center-right government coalitions passed a series of eco-
nomic and tax reforms (i.e., the introduction of the flat tax) that aimed to en-
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courage the private sector and foreign investors. Yet, much of the growth rec-
orded during this period was based on credit, consumption, and the remittances 
sent home by the 2.5 million Romanians living abroad (in Spain and Italy, in 
particular).  
The specter of the global financial crisis was ignored by Romanian politi-
cians who were busy campaigning for the general elections (in 2008) and the 
presidential elections (in 2009). In 2008, President’s Băsescu Democrat-Liberal 
Party (PD-L) won the relative majority and formed a coalition government with 
their arch-enemies, the Social Democrats. This alliance fell apart right before 
the presidential elections, when the PSD left the government. Traian Băsescu 
won narrowly a second term as President of Romania in 2009. He subsequently 
managed to form a new government coalition led by his party PD-L.  
The major theme of Băsescu’s and PD-L’s campaigns was the fight against 
corruption. This topic became irrelevant at the beginning of 2010, when Roma-
nia faced economic collapse. To avoid it, the government and President Băs-
escu appealed to the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, 
from which Romania borrowed money under very strict conditions. Against 
this backdrop, in May 2010 the Romanian government adopted a series of 
harsh austerity measures: public-sector employees’ wages were cut by 25%, 
some pensions were taxed, social benefits were reduced, the value added tax 
was increased from 19% to 24%, and thousands of state-sector employees were 
laid off. The economic crisis and the austerity measures also hit hard Roma-
nia’s private sector and potential foreign investors.  
During this time of economic hardship, old and presumably forgotten ills 
have resurfaced. Despite some important changes in the legal framework to 
combat corruption, the majority of Romanians became (again) dissatisfied with 
cronyism in state institutions and widespread corruption among politicians. 
Media accounts and reports of non-governmental organizations have revealed 
numerous shady (and quite outrageous) deals among central and/or local 
(elected) officials and politically-connected big-time entrepreneurs (or the so-
called “smart guys”). Seemingly the magnitude of such practices has increased 
especially in relation to the accession of the EU’s structural funds, which are 
meant to implement EU’s cohesion policy and diminish income, wealth, infra-
structural, and other regional disparities. In addition, private businesses have 
started again to denounce publicly the predatory, rent-seeking behaviors of 
public officials, which might be connected to the current crisis and recent wage 
cuts in the public-sector.  
Based on my own observations and on interviews conducted recently with 
political insiders and private entrepreneurs, it seems that Romania’s political 
capitalism has entered a new phase. If the period between 1990 and 2004 was 
marked by the phenomenon of power seeking wealth, since 2004 the dominant 
direction has been that of wealth seeking power. Local maverick businessper-
sons and other entrepreneurs now seek to enter politics to further increase their 
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wealth and benefit from various immunities. Ideology and moral standards 
seem to be irrelevant for recruiting new party members or candidates for vari-
ous positions in the government. Instead, mainstream political parties seem to 
recruit and promote first and foremost individuals who can finance political 
machines and electoral campaigns, through kick-backs and various other 
schemes. In the words of Lucian Croitoru, an advisor to the Governor of 
Romania’s Central Bank,  
in Romania, cliques (which represent the post-1989 symbiosis between legis-
lators and the new business elites) have captured our economy since Decem-
ber 1989. The current crisis in Romania is first and foremost an expression of 
governments’ failure to implement capitalism [like in the West – my note] in 
this country.” (Croitoru 2012) 
Coming from a close advisor of the Head of Romania’s National Bank these 
words sound indeed chilling. At the same time these words hint at why, more 
than two decades after Ceauşescu was executed, by most economic and social 
indicators, Romania is one of the poorest countries in the EU.  
6. Conclusion 
From a more general standpoint, the so-called “market transition debate” itself 
is paradoxical because, as history teaches us, no revolutionary change has 
resulted in a complete and radical reshuffling of a society’s social structure. 
Throughout history, former elites and/or their offspring have survived most 
revolutionary changes. Moreover, very few current mainstream academic jour-
nal would publish studies showing that, in the West, success in previous gen-
erations tends to produce success in subsequent generations. Yet, why have 
sociologists debated for so long about the outcomes of market transition? What 
has caused some scholars’ outrage vis a vis the buoyancy of former communist 
politicians, their network resources, and the pathologies of the old?  
First, scholars’ interest in (and moral indignation regarding) the survival of 
former communist politicians originate in the fact that in Romania and other 
Eastern European countries, the communist order was imposed by the Soviet 
Union at the end of World War II. Thus, to the extent that the previous system 
was deemed illegitimate, the advantages that some individuals (e.g., top level 
communists and other former officials) still derive from it are also perceived as 
illegitimate and unjust.  
Second, the market transition debate has also been generated by opposing 
sociological paradigms. For Marxist sociologists, the transition to a market 
economy would lead to dramatic increases in social inequality and would bring 
about many other ills they associate with contemporary capitalism. Scholars of 
neoliberal inspiration are less concerned with such effects and they might right-
fully ask what difference it makes if the Romanian ex-cadres are at an advan-
tage during transition. That is, who cares who is building capitalism as long as 
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it gets built? As historical evidence shows, there are multiple roads to such 
different forms of capitalism as “traditional commercial capitalism” and “po-
litical capitalism.” And, following Weber, not all of these forms can trigger the 
long term stable economic growth associated with Western rational capitalism. 
The latter phrase should not be interpreted as an over-idealization of current 
Western capitalism, which – as the current global crisis shows – has its own 
“sins” and limitations. Yet, for the protester cited at the beginning of this article 
and for many other Romanians, despite all its limitations, Western-like capital-
ism is definitely preferable to the current state of affairs in which the prevalent 
notion is that all individuals are out for themselves and everything – from pub-
lic offices to public assets – is for sale.  
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